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Attending college seems to be a proﬁtable and aﬀordable investment in the
US. Nevertheless, a number of academically talented young people still hes-
itate to attend college. This puzzle motivates this paper to test for whether
college education is a risky investment. To measure the riskiness of college
attendance, I estimate the risk diﬀerential in earnings between college at-
tendees and high school graduates. This paper copes with selection bias
problems and distinguishes permanent earnings risk from transitory earnings
risks. Evidence indicates that investing in a four-year college education is
indeed risky, suggesting that, under certain circumstances, the riskiness of
college attendance is an important factor in the schooling choice (JEL D81,
C25, I2. Key words: schooling, risk diﬀerential, risk premium, selection bias).1 Introduction
While numerous studies have measured the return to schooling using diﬀerent
methodologies, a consensus has emerged that going to college is a proﬁtable
investment. Extensive surveys by Card (1995a, 1999) report that the es-
timated returns to schooling are approximately between 8 percent and 13
percent per school year, which compares well with the high rate of returns
on stocks. Going to college seems to be not only proﬁtable, but also aﬀord-
able given that federal student aid programs provide guaranteed loans and
tuition subsidies to needy students. Nevertheless, a number of academically
talented young people do not attend a postsecondary institution. Table 1
presents the statistics on college attendance according to National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth. Among the cohort of high school graduates between
the ages 32 and 40 in 1997 with a scholastic ability test score in the top
quartile, about 16 percent did not attend college.
Much recent work explaining the reluctance to attend college emphasizes
the importance of family income and parental education to the schooling
decision.1 The aim of this paper is to examine one alternative explanation
by testing whether investing in a college education is risky. If there is un-
certainty in returns to education, measuring the risk premium on schooling
is as important as estimating the mean return. As future payoﬀs to college
education are uninsurable, an individual’s return to schooling is a random
variable. Provided that individual returns are normally distributed, both the
mean and variance will govern the schooling decision. To measure the riski-
ness of college attendance, this paper estimates the average risk diﬀerential
— the diﬀerence in variance of log earnings between college attendees and
high school graduates, conditional on predetermined individual diﬀerences.
I ﬁnd that the risk diﬀerential is statistically signiﬁcant and the magnitude
can be substantial, suggesting that the riskiness of college attendance is im-
portant under certain circumstances.
1Kane (1994), Ellwood and Kane (2000) and others argue that borrowing constraints
(or the short-run eﬀect of family income) may be a important factor contributing to
the reluctance to attend college. On the other hand, several authors assert that college
attendance or non-attendance is mainly explained by the long-run eﬀect of family income.
See Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999a, 1999b), Cameron and Taber (2000), Heckman
and Lochner (2000), Keane and Wolpin (1999), Shea (1998) and others. Recent studies
by Acemoglu and Pischke (2000) suggest that family income has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
college enrollments.
1The riskiness of attending college may result from lack of knowledge about
(1) individual ability, (2) the quality of each university, and (3) unanticipated
changes in market conditions. The ﬁrst two sources of risk cause a permanent
shock on future earnings, while the third source causes a transitory shock.
Mincer (1991) has documented that the risk of unemployment is lower for
more educated people. To simplify the analysis, this paper concentrates
attention on earnings risk and ignores the case of unemployment. Since no
insurance market exists to avoid uncertainties of future earnings, the analysis
focusing on the earnings risk is not trivial.
A number of early articles have attempted to measure the riskiness of
schooling in a no-unemployment context. Assuming that individuals cannot
borrow, Weiss (1972) shows that the coeﬃcient of variation in earnings is
a valid measure for the risk of schooling only if risk aversion is moderate.2
Allowing for free borrowing and general risk attitudes, Levhari and Weiss
(1974) approach this issue in a two-period model, in which the dynamics of
income risk is suppressed.3 They ﬁnd that earnings uncertainty discourages
investing in human capital if the dispersion of earnings increases with the
level of investment in human capital.
Pioneering estimations by Becker (1963, 1993) and Weiss (1972) use the
coeﬃcient of variation in earnings to estimate the risk of schooling without
controlling for individual diﬀerences. Estimations by Mincer (1974) and Ol-
son, White and Shefrin (1979) control for individual heterogeneity and use the
residual variance of an ordinary least squares estimation to measure earnings
risk. In particular, Olson, White and Shefrin identify transitory shocks as
the only source of earnings uncertainty and use a ﬁxed-eﬀects model to esti-
mate the transitory earnings uncertainties.4 Besides the problem of omitting
permanent earnings risk, potential problems of selection bias are ignored as
well. Selection biases arise if the distribution of individual returns to school-
ing correlates with the schooling decision. As a result, the ordinary least
2The imposed condition restricts the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be between
zero and one.
3Another paper by Olson, White and Shefrin (1979) emphasizes the dynamics of income
risk. They study the optimal investment in schooling in a multiple-period model. They
specify an indirect utility function by assuming a particular loan/repayment plan.
4Recent literature on the equity premium puzzle considers transitory earnings uncer-
tainty to be the only source of earnings risk. See Campbell (1996), Buckinsky and Leslie
(1997), and Palacio-Huerta (1999). Little attention is paid to permanent earnings uncer-
tainty.
2squares estimation often understates the true variance, and understate or
overstate the diﬀerences in variances. In the existing literature, the problem
of selection bias has long been neglected in estimating the earnings risk for
diﬀerent levels of schooling.
In this paper I use Heckman’s two-step scheme to correct for selection
biases. To characterize the problem of selection bias, I develop a simple
schooling choice model built on the work by Levhari and Weiss (1974) and
Willis and Rosen (1979). Based on the schooling choice model, a measure for
risk premium on schooling is deﬁned, and the self-selection problem is charac-
terized. The model implies that under certain circumstances the permanent
risk diﬀerential is a major determinant of risk premium on schooling, while
the transitory risk diﬀerential is not. The aim of my empirical studies is to
disentangle these two risk diﬀerentials and treat the selectivity biases. After
treating selection biases, estimates of permanent risk diﬀerentials dramati-
cally increase by 77-163 percent. Using a ﬁxed-eﬀects model to disentangle
permanent and transitory earnings uncertainties, I ﬁnd that the permanent
risk diﬀerential of a four-year college education is signiﬁcantly positive, sug-
gesting that a four-year college education is a risky investment. In addition,
I ﬁnd that the transitory risk diﬀerential of a four-year college education is
signiﬁcantly negative, implying that attending a four-year college may reduce
transitory earnings uncertainties.
The next section lays out schooling choice models and empirical speciﬁ-
cations. Section 3 overviews the data, Section 4 summarizes the results, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Schooling Choice Model
Consider a set of high school graduates who must decide whether or not to
attend college in the beginning of period zero. They make this decision based
upon the information about their abilities, the quality of each university, and
the distribution of random shocks. However, this kind of information may be
very limited when individuals have only recently graduated from high school.
Owing to lack of information, high school graduates may be uncertain about
the number of years of postsecondary education they will take in the future.
An individual may decide to attend college without knowing whether he
will drop out in the middle of his undergraduate years or attend graduate
school later. My analysis focuses on the endogeneity of the decision to attend
3college, s = 1 or 0; given uncertainty in returns to schooling. Without
an insurance market to secure the returns to schooling, such uncertainty is
inevitable.
The uncertainty in the return to schooling can be measured by the vari-
ance of log earnings, conditional on individual characteristics. This section
presents a simple model to estimate this measure. An individual’s decision
to attend college is essentially like choosing a distribution of future earn-
ings. Both the mean and variance are involved in determining his schooling
decision. Individuals attend college only if the lifetime beneﬁt from a col-
lege education exceeds the opportunity cost, taking both the returns and
the spread of the returns into account. Hence, the distribution of earnings
observed by econometricians is incidentally truncated, but the true distribu-
tion of earnings is not. Ignoring this truncation problem, an ordinary least
squares estimation understates the true variance of earnings for each level of
schooling.
In the ﬁrst subsection I use a schooling choice rule to characterize this
truncation problem. In the second subsection I show how the truncation
problem can be solved so that the true risk and risk diﬀerential of schooling
can be identiﬁed. Before these two subsections, it is useful to clarify the link
between schooling and earnings.
Suppose there is neither unemployment nor a borrowing constraint. In-
dividuals can freely borrow or lend at a constant interest rate r. Annual
earnings yit (si) is determined by the level of schooling si; individual charac-
teristics, work experience (t¡si) at period t, and unanticipated shocks: If per-
son i decides not to attend college, he can earn yit (0) in period t = 0;1;:::;T,
where T is the total number of work years during one’s lifetime. If student
i decides to attend college, he pays tuition fees and stays at school full-
time at t = 0. Upon graduating from college, he can earn yit (1) in period
t = 1;2;:::;T:
To identify the risk of schooling, I control for individual diﬀerences using
Mincer’s (1974) earnings function. Given a schooling choice s = 0 or 1;
consider a log annual earnings equation for person i who ﬁnishes his education
(t = s;s + 1;:::;T):




i¯s2 + ¾a (s)ai + ¾" (s)"it; (1)
where ni is the number of schooling years, xit is a vector of the number of
years of work experience (t ¡ ni) and experience squared, and zi is a vector
4of individual i0s characteristics. zi consists of i’s scholastic ability test score
(Afqt), i’s parental education, whether i lived with parents at age 14, i’s gen-
der, race, marital status, and i’s cohort eﬀects, and regional dummies.5 The
time-invariant individual eﬀect ¾a (s)ai represents a permanent shock, while
the transitory component ¾" (s)"it represents a transitory shock. Although
both shocks are unobserved by an individual while his schooling choice is
made, parameters about the distributions of both shocks are common knowl-
edge. Suppose ai and "it are standard normal, N (0;1); and independent of
each other and across individuals. The transitory shocks are assumed to be
identically and independently distributed. Supposed also that measurement
errors in regressors are equally dispersed between diﬀerent levels of schooling.
Hence, the eﬀect of measurement errors is cancelled out in estimating risk
diﬀerentials.
The risk for a given schooling choice s is deﬁned by the variance of perma-
nent and transitory shocks, conditional on ni;xit and zi. Transitory shocks
are considered less important relative to permanent shocks in measuring the
risk because, heuristically, transitory shocks can be “averaged out” over one’s
lifetime, while permanent shocks persist for each period. The Permanent
Income Hypothesis is an extreme example, in which the risk caused by tran-
sitory shocks is almost negligible. Although this concept is intuitively clear,
an analytical solution for a stochastic dynamic model of consumption only
exists under very restrictive conditions.6 Consequently, it is diﬃcult to de-
termine the relative importance of both permanent and transitory earnings
uncertainties. With this complication, my empirical strategy is to separately
estimate the variances of permanent and transitory shocks. By doing this, I
test whether the average risk diﬀerential is signiﬁcantly positive for perma-
nent shocks and for transitory shocks.7
If there is no selection bias, both variances can be easily estimated by
a ﬁxed-eﬀects model. However, problems of selection bias arise because the
distribution of earnings is dependent upon the schooling decision. To under-
stand the nature of the problems, it is useful to consider how a risk-averse
5The series on marital status and the regional dummies actually vary over time. They
are treated as time-invariant variables for convenience of demonstration.
6See Blundell and Stoker (1999).
7Heterogeneity in the risk and the risk diﬀerential can be also considered in this frame-
work. For instance, the variance may diﬀer in parental education; p = 1 or 0 indicates
whether or not parents attended college. Then, the variance can be written as ¾2
a (s;p)
and ¾2
" (s;p); and the hypothesis testing is conducted conditional on p:
5individual decides to invest in a college education in the presence of uncer-
tainties. The following subsection presents a simple schooling choice rule to
facilitate my empirical analysis.
2.1 Schooling Choice Rule
Three important components in my model are worth noting. First, the cost
function of attendance is formulated in a form similar to Cameron and Heck-
man’s (1998) model:
¹i0 (1) = ¡¿ie
¡´i;
where ¿i is tuition fees and ´i is an unobservable individual eﬀect which is
unobservable to econometricians but is observed by individual i. ´i indicates
the eﬀect of parental taste or family support on the decision to attend college.
For exposition, I assume that the ´i is standard normal although this is not
necessary (see below). Note that permanent shocks may be correlated with
´i; E [´iai] = ½; while the transitory shocks are identically distributed and
independent, particularly of ´i:
Second, log earnings are decomposed into two components — non-stochastic
and stochastic — in an additively separable form, as deﬁned in Mincer’s equa-
tion (1). To disentangle earnings uncertainty from non-stochastic individual
diﬀerences, it is useful to deﬁne another notation. Deﬁne ¹it (s) as person i’s
non-stochastic earnings stream in period t for a given level of schooling s,





as t = s;s + 1;:::;T: As an example, if there is no uncertainty, yit (s) =
¹it (s). Third, the model emphasizes the importance of permanent shocks
by assuming an individual’s expected lifetime utility is a function of lifetime
earnings, exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (see Appendix).
If there is no uncertainty, a commonly-used approach to describe the
schooling decision begins with Becker’s (1967) model. In Becker’s model,
an individual makes a schooling decision by calculating his lifetime earnings.















where R is the discount factor and I f¢g is an indicator function. Notably,
both direct cost ¿ie¡´i and foregone earnings ¹it(0) have been incorporated
in Becker’s model.
6If there is uncertainty, an individual who is risk-averse will discount his
payoﬀ to schooling. To approach the schooling choice problem, one may
consider a stochastic dynamic model of consumption. Unfortunately, such a
model is rarely solvable. Instead, it is useful to begin with a simple model
with no transitory shocks. Built on Levhari and Weiss’s (1974) two-period
model, the model suppresses the dynamics of earnings risk and emphasizes
the importance of permanent shocks.
An appendix shows that if the lifetime utility function exhibits constant
relative risk aversion, individuals are averse to risk, transitory shocks can be
smoothed out over a lifetime, and the distribution of earnings is log-normal,






























where ° is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ½ is the correlation
coeﬃcient between permanent shocks ai and the individual eﬀect ´i. If in-
dividuals are risk neutral (i.e. ° = 1) or permanent shocks can be fully
anticipated by observing ´i (i.e. E(a´i) = 0), the choice rule degenerates to
the case where there is no uncertainty. In this paper, the gap in permanent
earnings risk (¾2
a (1) ¡ ¾2
a (0)) is referred to as the average risk diﬀerential
caused by permanent shocks.
The right-hand-side of the above inequality, denoting the cost resulting














Earnings uncertainty can inﬂuence individuals’ schooling decisions if school-
ing is risky and individuals are averse to risk. It could happen that schooling
is beneﬁcial to individuals’ future earnings but is unattractive to those who
are highly averse to risk because going to college is risky. The goal of my
empirical analysis is to examine the signiﬁcance of riskiness of college atten-
dance. To do so, I estimate the average risk diﬀerentials caused by permanent
shocks and transitory shocks, and treat potential selection biases.
The schooling choice rule motivates an empirical selection equation, which
facilitates a treatment for the selection bias. The empirical selection equation
7can be derived by substituting Mincer’s regression (1) into the schooling
choice rule (3),8
si = I f´i > µ0 + µ1 ln¿i + z
0
iµ2g; (5)
where µk are parameters, ¿i is person i’s cost of attendance, zi is person i’s
time-invariant characteristics, and ´i represents the unobservable individual
eﬀect associated with parental taste or support for schooling. ´i can be nor-
malized to be a random variable with zero mean and unit variance, given
parameters µ0;µ1 and µ2. I assume that ´i follows a standard normal distri-
bution. The regressors zi include the year in which person i graduated from
high school (hgy),9 hgy squared, Afqt, parental education, gender, race, and
regional dummies. The log of cost of attendance ln¿i is an instrumental vari-
able implied by the schooling choice rule. I denote the single index function
by w0
iµ = µ0+µ1 ln¿i+z0
iµ2. Notice that the risk premium (including the risk
diﬀerential as well as the correlation and preference parameters) is hidden in
the constant term µ0 and cannot be singled out. Details on data sources and
variable deﬁnitions can be seen in the Data section.
The empirical selection equation characterizes the selection problems in
estimating risk diﬀerentials. In the case where individual eﬀect ´i is corre-
lated with permanent earnings uncertainty ai, the distribution of observed
























it¯s1: The second equality is appropriate only if the following
three conditions are satisﬁed: (1) the years of schooling are constant within both of the
schooling groups (so that ®1ni = ® for si = 1; and ®0ni = 0 for si = 0), (2) there is no
heterogeneity for the eﬀect of time-invariant individual characteristics, ¯s2 = ¯2, and (3)
there is no transition from work to school, such that years of work experience xit = t¡si
for all i; where t refers to the number of periods from the high school graduation year to
the current year. Hence, As only depends on schooling level s but does not vary across
individuals. Then, it implies that
si = I f´i > µ0 + µ1 ln¿i + z0
iµ2g;
where µ0 = ¡ln
¡
A1e® ¡ A0erisk°¢
;µ1 = 1; and µ2 = ¡¯2:
9Notice that number of years of schooling and cohort eﬀects cannot fully determine
the high school graduation year because the number of years of schooling at college is not
constant across individuals.
8earnings will be more concentrated for a given level of schooling. Hence, the
estimated variance of ai using OLS is often biased downward. The extent of
this bias can be fully speciﬁed if the ´i and ai are normally distributed. The
next subsection presents a full parametric approach to identify earnings risk
and risk diﬀerentials.
2.2 Identifying Average Risk Diﬀerentials
Two major tasks are necessary to identify both permanent earnings risk
and transitory earnings risk, and, meanwhile, cope with potential selection
biases. The ﬁrst task is to utilize a ﬁxed-eﬀects model to disentangle perma-
nent shocks from transitory shocks. The second is to use Heckman’s scheme
to correct selection bias, if any. More speciﬁcally, the transitory compo-
nent of variations in log earnings can be identiﬁed by a ﬁxed-eﬀects model
since time-invariant selection biases are entirely cancelled out. Meanwhile,
the combined component of variations can be identiﬁed by a between-eﬀects
model, in which selection biases arise but can be corrected by Heckman’s
scheme. Finally, the permanent component of variation is singled out by
subtracting the transitory component from the combined component.
The key to ﬁx the selection bias is to exploit the fact that selection biases
are time-invariant. The selection bias is simply subtracted out in the ﬁxed-
eﬀects model. From Mincer’s equation (1), the ﬁxed-eﬀects model can be
written as
lnyit ¡ lnyi = (xit ¡ xi)
0 ® + ¾" (s)("it ¡ "i); (6)
where lnyi;"i; and xi denote the individual average of lnyit;"it; and xit re-








where MSEf is the mean squared error in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model, T ´
N=
P
i (1=Ti); and N is the number of respondents, and Ti is the number of
observations for respondent i.
Second, consider a between-eﬀects model, deﬁned by averaging individual
earnings over years. I illustrate the way to treat selection biases by using the
subsample of college attendees (si = 1 or ´i > µ0wi) as follows. Given the
information about individual attributes, qi ´ (xi1;xi2;¢¢¢ ;xiT;wi;´i); the
9between-eﬀects model can be written as:
E [lnyi j´i > w
0





+ E [¾a (1)ai + ¾" (1)"i j´i > w
0
iµ;qi]; (8)
where E is the expectation operator for a given joint normal distribution
of the triple (´i;ai;"it). The last term is the selectivity correction for the
mean earnings. Under the normality condition, the selectivity correction can
be fully speciﬁed by taking the conditional expectation on combined error
terms:
E [¾a (1)ai + ¾" (1)"i j´i > w
0
iµ;qi] = ¯¸ (1)¸1i;
where ¸1i is often called the inverse Mills ratio, and ¯¸ (1) ´ ¾a (1)½ is
the coeﬃcient of the inverse Mills ratio.10 Similarly, under the normality
condition, the variation in combined error terms is fully identiﬁed: 11




a (1) + ¾
2
" (1)=T ¡ ¯
2
¸ (1)±1i; (9)
where ±1i ´ ¸1i (¸1i ¡ w0
iµ) is between zero and one.12 The last term ¯2
¸ (1)±1i
is a selectivity correction for the variance of the combined error terms. Be-
cause this selectivity correction is positive according to theory, the ordinary
least squares estimation often understates the true variance of the combined
residuals. Notably, the mean squared error MSEb of the between-eﬀects
model is a consistent estimator for the variance of the combined residuals,
which is the left-hand-side of the above equality. This yields the identiﬁcation
of the true variance of the combined residuals:
b ¾
2
a (1) + b ¾
2
" (1)=T = MSEb + b ¯
2
¸ (1)±1; (10)
where ±1 is the average of ±1i for the subsample of college attendees.
Finally, the variance ¾2
a (1) of permanent shock is identiﬁed by subtracting
the variance of transitory shocks from the unbiased combined component, i.e.
10Let f and F denote the normal density and distribution respectively. The inverse
Mills ratio is given by ¸0i = ¡f (µ0wi)=F (µ0wi) for high school graduates and ¸1i =
f (µ0wi)=(1 ¡ F (µ0wi)) for college attendees.
11Identiﬁcation of the average risk diﬀerential relies on the normality assumption in
this paper. Another working paper by Chen and Khan (2001) shows that without the
normality assumption the average risk diﬀerential, scaled by the variance of earnings of
high school graduates, can still be identiﬁed.
12For proofs, see Theorem 20.2 and Theorem 20.4 in Greene (1997).
10the right-hand-side of the above equation. Notably, the variance of transitory
shocks has been consistently estimated in the ﬁrst step. It is the permanent
component of variation that has selection biases and is understated by the
ordinary least squares. This identiﬁcation procedure also works for the sub-
sample of high school graduates.
The average risk diﬀerentials for permanent and transitory shocks can be
identiﬁed by taking respective diﬀerences in the variances. Since a limiting
distribution of an estimated risk diﬀerential is not available, bootstrapping
is used to generate conﬁdence intervals. In bootstrapping, I randomly draw
1001 resamples of size N from the original sample with replacement, which
generates an empirical distribution of average risk diﬀerentials. A percentile
method is utilized to determine the endpoints of conﬁdence intervals.13 The
next section provides details about data. Section 4 reports empirical results.
3 Data
Statistics and estimations are based on the National Longitudinal Survey for
Youth (NLSY): 1979-98. The sample consists of 12,686 young respondents,
who were between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979. Observations are included if
(1) respondents have a high school diploma or a general equivalency diploma;
(2) respondents are from a representative cross-section sample and are not
in the military; (3) nominal hourly wages are between 1 and 150. The ﬁrst
criterion excludes 3086 respondents who did not graduate from high school.
The second criterion additionally excludes 4363 non-representative respon-
dents to derive a reliable estimate using a random sample. The remaining
sample contains 5237 respondents, and each respondent has 12 to 17 years
of observations. The third criterion excludes 1939 observations, where 54
respondents are entirely dropped. Nominal variables are normalized by the
Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deﬂator for the base year 1992. Ac-
cording to these criterions, there are 5183 respondents and 67018 observations
remaining in the sample.
The series on highest grade completed in NLSY shows a number of obvious
inconsistencies. For example, several respondents indicate in questionnaires
that they have attended a two-year or a four-year college but the number
of years of schooling is no more than nine. To resolve this problem, besides
13For a 95 percent signiﬁcance level, the conﬁdence interval of the risk diﬀerential is
derived by choosing the top 2.5 percentile and the bottom 2.5 percentile.
11manual correction and programming, I use both college attendance and the
highest grade completed to identify high school graduates and college atten-
dees. Speciﬁcally, a respondent is identiﬁed as a high school graduate if his
highest grade completed equals 12. A respondent is identiﬁed as a two-year
college attendee if he attended a two-year college but never attended a four-
year college, or his highest grade completed is greater than 12 and no more
than 15. Finally, a respondent is identiﬁed as a four-year college attendee if
he has attended a four-year college, or his highest grade completed exceeds
15. Among the 5183 respondents, 3511 individuals are identiﬁed as college
attendees.
The scholastic ability score is measured by the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test (Afqt) score, a composite score consisting of four tests: a vocabulary
test, a mathematics test, a reading comprehension test, and an analytical
test. Since the test was conducted for all cohorts in the sample in 1980, the
original Afqt scores are not comparable across diﬀerent age groups. To resolve
this problem, I generate a variable representing the individual deviations
from the average Afqt for the corresponding cohort, and then categorize the
variable by 100 quantiles.
NLSY provides longitudinal information about work history, starting from
the year 1975 when respondents were of age 10-18. A precise measure of work
experience is constructed accordingly. Work experience is derived from the
cumulative number of annual working weeks, divided by the number of total
weeks. Notably, many respondents had work experience before completing
education. Those work years before returning to school are counted as part
of work experience. However, observations in those years are excluded from
the wage equation because earnings between school years are not determined
by the education received during later years.
Cost of attendance is used as an instrument in the selection equation,
which is determined by both college proximity and direct cost of attendance.
Precisely deﬁned, cost of attendance is the cost of attending a local in-state
public four-year college while the respondent was 17 years old.14 If several
four-year public colleges are located within an individual’s county of resi-
dence, the average in-state tuition of those public four-year colleges is used
to deﬁne the local cost of attendance for this individual. If no four-year
14I measure cost of attendance using the county of residence at age 14, instead of that
at age 17, since the former has as twice as many sample points of the latter one. In
fact, both measures are highly correlated; their coeﬃcient of correlation equals .88 for the
full-sample.
12public college exists within an individual’s county of residence, local cost
of attendance for this individual is deﬁned by the sum of average in-state
tuition, room, and board charged by the public four-year colleges located
in the state.15 Both tuition and college proximity variables are generated
from the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS): 1974-82.
In HEGIS, tuition data is the tuition fees paid by a typical full-time under-
graduate to an accredited college in an academic year. Room and board data
are the expenses actually charged by institutions at a seven-day weekly basis
in an academic year.
We note that cost of attendance may be correlated with income. If so,
the cost of attendance cannot be utilized as an instrument. To resolve this
problem, I deﬂate cost of attendance in a county by the average hourly wage
of unskilled workers in that county. To generate the deﬂator, I use average
wage rate per job in service, agriculture, wholesale and retail trade industries
in the county of residence at age 17. The local wage rates of unskilled workers
are constructed from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS):
1974-82. Both REIS and HEGIS are merged with NLSY in accordance with
the county of residence at age 17. Notice that years 1974-82 are chosen
because the respondents, born during the years of 1956 to 1965, were 17
years old in those years.
Parental education is measured by three variables: an individual’s mother’s
highest grade completed, father’s highest grade completed, and their inter-
action. Family income is deﬁned by the average of per capita family income
between the ages 16 and 17, where per capita family income is measured by
dividing the total family income by the number of family members. In the
initial cohort of the NLSY survey, since half of respondents’ age is greater
than 17 years old, family income in the half of sample is not well deﬁned,
and the sample size is reduced by half. To derive a more reliable statistics
on family income, I add in the NLSY supplemental sample16 to increase my
sample size only in estimating levels of family income (see Table 2). After
15Two states are exceptional. First, Washington D.C. have six public four-year colleges,
but none of them provides data about room or board. I use the average in-state tuition
charged by these six colleges to deﬁne the local cost of attendance for all counties in
Washington D.C. Second, Wyoming state has no public four-year college. I use the average
of the total expense on (out-of-state) tuition, room and board at all four-year universities,
including public and private, located in the surrounding states of Wyoming.
16The NLSY supplement sample is designed to oversample Hispanic, black, and eco-
nomically disadvantaged non-black and non-Hispanic youths.
13doing this, I have a set of 5295 respondents for whom there are no missing
observation on those relevant variables. The total sample is categorized into
three classes — low, middle and high family income — according to the val-
ues at the 33th and 66th percentiles of the family income distribution, where
each class contains one-third of the total sample.
4 Results
I provide three sets of results. First, I examine the characteristics and earn-
ings of college-educated versus high school graduates. These results are given
as a baseline comparison. They also demonstrate the importance of control-
ling individual characteristics and treating selection biases. Next, I present
results from the estimation procedure described in Section 2.2. Finally, I in-
terpret the results by approximating the risk premium of college attendance
based on a speciﬁc risk attitude.
4.1 Characteristics and Earnings of College Trained
versus High School
In this subsection, I present the composition of the college and high school
variables. I also compare their means and variances of log earnings, and their
coeﬃcients of variation in earnings. These results are use to examine the
importance of controlling for individual characteristics and treating selection
biases.
Tables 2 and 3 compare characteristics of college attendees versus high
school graduates. Columns 1 to 3 use the full sample (deﬁned in the Data
Section) and columns 4 and 5 use the sample in the Afqt top quartile. Item 1
shows that high schools have a slightly higher proportion of white and female
students than colleges do. The ratio of whites in the top Afqt quartile is
greater than that in the overall sample, whereas the ratio of females in the
top Afqt quartile is smaller. Item 2 reports the number of years of schooling
and cost of attendance. The most talented people who attended college have
.8 more years of postsecondary education than the average college attendees.
In addition, a postsecondary education seems to be less costly for those who
attended college. The cost of attending a local public four-year college is
used as an instrument to correct selection biases.
14Item 3 summarizes family background variables. There is an obvious gap
in both family income and parental education between those who attended
college and those who did not. In particular, individuals who attended col-
lege have 16 to 26 percent more family income than those who did not. In
addition, of those people who attended college, 47 percent had parents who
attended college; of those who did not attend college, only 15 percent had
parents who attended college. Table 3 summarizes the employment status of
the sample. For all levels of education, people with academic talent tend to
earn more and work longer than the average.
Table 4 reports preliminary statistics about the eﬀect of college atten-
dance on earnings for white males in two eight-year spans, between the ages
23 and 28 during 1982-89, and between the ages 31 and 36 during 1990-97.
Similar to Becker’s (1964, 1993) analysis, the statistics are derived without
controlling for interpersonal diﬀerences. Item 1 shows that earnings increase
with age and schooling. To measure the risk and the risk diﬀerential, I ﬁrst
estimate the variance and the diﬀerence in variance between college atten-
dees and high school graduates. I also distinguish the variation in log wage
caused by permanent and transitory shocks. For a preliminary analysis, I use
the variance of deviations from the individual eight-year average to measure
the risk caused by transitory shocks, and use the variance of the actual indi-
vidual eight-year average to measure the risk caused by permanent shocks.
Item 2 shows that from 1980s to 1990s, the variations in earnings caused by
transitory shocks decreased, while the variations caused by permanent shocks
increased. Item 3 shows that the diﬀerences in the variance of the individual
average, which represents the riskiness due to permanent shocks, increased
dramatically from 1980s to 1990s. In the meantime, the diﬀerences in the
variance of deviation from individual average, which denotes the riskiness
due to transitory shocks, decreased by 30 percent.
Using the 1940-1950 Census of Population and Education, Becker (1964,
1993) used the coeﬃcients of variation in earnings to measure earnings un-
certainty for those who attended college versus those who did not.17 In the
1940 survey, he found that four-year college graduates exceed high school
graduates in terms of the variation in earnings by the ratio of 1.32 to 1 for
the sample during the ages 25-29, and the ratio decreases to 1:1.05 for the
sample during the ages 30-34. In the 1950 survey, the ratios for those two age
groups increased to 1:1.67 and 1:1.24 respectively. Using NLSY, I compute
17The estimates can be found in Table 10 of Chapter 5 in Becker (1993).
15the coeﬃcient of variation to be comparable to Becker’s ﬁnding. The results
are similar to Becker’s to a certain extent: the coeﬃcients of variation in
earnings are often higher for individuals who are college-educated relative to
those who are not. During the 1980s, four-year college attendees exceeded
high school graduates in terms of the variation in individual average earn-
ings by the ratio of 1:1.15 when respondents were 23-28 years old. During
the 1990s, the ratio decreases to 1:1.05 when respondents were 31-36 years
old.
Without controlling for individual diﬀerences, however, coeﬃcients of
variation do not fully measure the earnings uncertainty since individual char-
acteristics that are unrelated to earnings uncertainty are all included in the
coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient of college attendees may exceed that of high
school graduates because people who attended college are more diverse than
those who did not, or because college attendees tent to face higher earnings
risk than high school graduates do. The analysis below controls for individual
characteristics to measure the extent of earnings risk. In the previous calcu-
lation, selection bias problems were ignored. After controlling for individual
characteristics and correcting for selection biases, more accurate estimates
are reported in the next subsection.
4.2 Estimation Results
This subsection reports the empirical results after controlling for individual
heterogeneity and treating selection biases. The earnings risk and the risk
diﬀerentials caused by permanent and transitory shocks are identiﬁed using
the method introduced in Section 2.2. There are three steps. First, I use
a ﬁxed-eﬀects model to estimate the risk and risk diﬀerential of transitory
shocks. Note that the selection bias is time-invariant. The nuisance term of
selectivity correction is “diﬀerenced” out in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. Hence,
the estimated risk diﬀerential of transitory shocks is consistent and has no
selection bias. The second and third steps correspond to Heckman’s two-
stage scheme, in which the selection bias associated with permanent shocks
is treated. In the second step, I estimate a probit model to derive a selectivity
correction term. Using this selection correction, in the third step I identify
the combined variance of the shocks using a between-eﬀects model, as shown
in equation (8). Finally, the permanent earnings risk is singled out from the
combined component by simple subtraction. The results of these three steps
are summarized in Tables 5-8.
16Table 5 presents the results of the ﬁxed-eﬀects model, in which devia-
tions of log wage from the individual average are considered for all survey
years (see equation (6)). The explanatory variables are all time-variant, in-
cluding the number of years of work experience, experience squared, marital
status and regional dummies. Notably, the observations of work experience
before ﬁnishing college are excluded from the sample; therefore, the number
of years of schooling is time-invariant and is excluded from the ﬁxed-eﬀects
model. Items 1b and 1c compare the experience-earnings proﬁles among dif-
ferent levels of schooling, which indicate that college attendees tend to have
a steeper experience-earnings proﬁle relative to high school graduates.
Item 3 in Table 5 presents the risk and risk diﬀerentials that result from
transitory shocks. In Item 3a it appears that transitory earnings risk is
slightly smaller for higher school graduates than the college attendees. To
estimate the risk diﬀerentials, I take diﬀerences in variance between college
attendees and high school graduates. Item 3b shows that the risk diﬀer-
entials of transitory shocks are signiﬁcantly negative and approximately 17
percent to 19 percent. These suggest that college attendees, either two-year
or four-year, may face less transitory earnings uncertainties than high school
graduates do. Notice that the estimates of risk diﬀerentials caused by tran-
sitory shocks are consistent, with no selection bias.
Similar to Olson, White, and Shefrin (1979), the transitory earnings un-
certainty is estimated using a ﬁxed-eﬀects model. Olson et al presumes that
attending college causes additional transitory earnings uncertainty but does
not cause any additional permanent earnings uncertainty. They ﬁnd that the
variance of permanent shocks (or the variance of individual speciﬁc eﬀects)
is a constant .0743, and the variance of transitory shocks increases in levels
of schooling. For instance, the variance of transitory shocks is .0727 for high
school graduates and .1204 for individuals with one year of college education.
However, Table 5 indicates that the variance of transitory shocks decreases
by levels of schooling if permanent earnings risk can vary with these levels.
Item 4 of Table 5 reports the risk and risk diﬀerentials caused by perma-
nent shocks. The estimates in this item are biased because the self-selection
problem has not been treated yet. Comparing Item 2a to 3a, permanent
earnings uncertainties are smaller than transitory earnings uncertainties for
high school graduates, but larger for college attendees. In fact, Item 5 shows
that the permanent shocks account for 54 to 58 percent of the total unex-
plained variation in earnings of college attendees. In Item 4b, permanent
risk diﬀerentials are all signiﬁcantly positive, compared to Item 3b where
17transitory risk diﬀerentials are all signiﬁcantly negative. These results seem
to imply that investing in a college education may decrease the transitory
earnings risk but increase the permanent earnings risk.
Table 6 reports the determinants of college attendance, according to a
probit estimation. In row (a), the cost of attendance has a strong negative
eﬀect on schooling decisions. If the cost of attendance increases one percent,
the college enrollment rate may decrease by 3.9 percent, with as low as .008
of the standard error. This variable is chosen as an instrumental variable
to treat selection biases because it is directly correlated with the schooling
choice but not correlated with individual earnings. Note that to remove the
local income eﬀect on the instrument, I have deﬂated the instrument by the
average wage of local unskilled workers. See the Data Section for details.
The high school graduation year, as shown in row (b), has signiﬁcant
explanatory power for college enrollment. Rows (c) and (d) reveal that both
scholastic ability and parental education are inﬂuential in the decision to
enroll in college. Rows (e) and (f) present evidence that both blacks and
females are more likely to enroll in college than non-African American males.
To be more speciﬁc, other things being equal, blacks have a 22 percent higher
probability of attending college than other races, while females have a 6.2
higher probability of attending college than males. As an extreme example,
a high-ability black female who lived with both parents during youth in a
low-tuition county is more likely to attend college than any other type of
individual.
Table 7 reports the results of the between-eﬀects model, in which the vari-
ation in individual average earnings over survey years is explained by several
time-invariant variables. The selectivity correction term (or the inverse Mills
ratio), constructed from the probit model, is included as one of the regres-
sors. Row (k) reports that, except for the two-year college attendees, the
inverse Mills ratio is signiﬁcant for all levels of schooling. In particular, for
four-year college attendees, the coeﬃcient for the inverse Mills ratio in the log
wage equation is .336, with a small .088 of the standard error. This suggests
that the selectivity bias may not be negligible and the instrumental variable
eﬀectively corrects the selectivity bias in most of the cases.
The controls of the probit are included in the between-eﬀects model, but
both cost of attendance and high school graduation years (hgy) are excluded.
Cost of attendance is excluded since it serves as an instrumental variable; hgy
is also excluded since it can be fully determined by years of schooling, years
of experience, and cohort eﬀects.
18As shown in row (a) of Table 7, the marginal returns to years of schooling
are 4.4 percent and 6.5 percent for a two-year and four-year college educa-
tion, respectively. The estimates in the literature range from 8 to 13 percent
(see Card [1995a, 1999]), larger than my estimates because I control for both
scholastic ability scores and parental education. Rows (b) and (c) suggest
that the eﬀects of work experience on earnings are not as signiﬁcant as the
eﬀects of schooling. Rows (d) and (e) report the eﬀects of scholastic ability
and parental education on earnings. We note that an individual’s ability
only plays a minor role in explaining earnings, whereas parental education is
often important to explain the levels of earnings, especially for those who en-
rolled in a four-year college. In contrast, both scholastic ability and parental
education are inﬂuential in shaping the schooling decision, as shown in rows
(c) and (d) in Table 6.
Rows (f) and (g) of Table 7 report that female African-Americans have a
signiﬁcant disadvantage in earnings relative to males or non-African-Americans.
In particular, holding other individual attributes constant, African Ameri-
cans earn 21.6 percent less than non-African-Americans, and females earn
26.5 percent less than males. This is a puzzle given that female African-
Americans are more likely to attend college than males or non-African-
Americans, as shown in Table 6. This suggests that racial and gender biases
in college enrollment are less severe than the racial and gender biases in labor
markets.
Item 2 of Table 7 shows that interpersonal diﬀerences account for 33 to 40
percent of variation in individual average earnings over the years. The rest
of the variation may be due to earnings uncertainty or measurement errors.
If the variance of measurement errors are independent of schooling choices,
the variation in earnings caused by measurement errors can be subtracted
out in estimating risk diﬀerentials. In this case, the diﬀerence in variances of
earnings is still a reasonable measure for the riskiness of college attendance
even with the presence of measurement errors.
Table 8 reports the consistent estimates of risk and risk diﬀerentials. For
convenience of comparison, in item 1 I duplicate the estimated transitory
risk and risk diﬀerentials that are derived from item 3 of Table 5. Item 2
of Table 8 presents the estimates of permanent earnings risk and risk dif-
ferentials. Compared to the estimates with selection biases in item 4 of
Table 5, the variances of permanent shocks adjust upward for all levels of
schooling after correcting for selection biases, as equation (9) suggests. This
selectivity correction adjustment ranges between 11 percent and 41 percent.
19Taking diﬀerences in these unbiased variances, the consistent estimates of
permanent risk diﬀerentials increase dramatically. The selectivity correction
adjustment on the permanent risk diﬀerentials ranges between 53 percent
and 147 percent. In particular, the risk diﬀerential for a four-year college ed-
ucation increases from .051 to .126, while the risk diﬀerential for a two-year
college education increases from .015 to .023. Conﬁdence intervals, generated
by bootstrapping, indicate that the permanent risk diﬀerential of a four-year
college education is signiﬁcantly positive, while that of a two-year college ed-
ucation is insigniﬁcant and approaches zero. Interpretations of my ﬁndings
follow.
4.3 Discussion
To understand how risk diﬀerentials inﬂuence schooling decisions, recall the
schooling choice rule deﬁned in equation (3). There are three components
that determine the magnitude of risk premium: the risk diﬀerential, the
degree of risk aversion, and the correlation coeﬃcient between unobserved
individual eﬀects and earnings uncertainty. As an example, suppose that the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals two, and the correlation between
unobserved individual eﬀects and earnings uncertainty is negligible. The
schooling choice model in Section 2 shows that the risk premium of schooling
is approximately equal to one half of the risk diﬀerential caused by permanent
shocks.
Given that the annual return to a four-year college education is 6.5 per-
cent, according to row (a) of Table 7, the lifetime return to a four-year college
education is about 29:7 percent.18 Since the risk diﬀerential caused by per-
manent shocks is :126 for a four-year college attendee, the risk premium on
a four-year college education is approximately equal to 12:6=2 = 6:3 percent.
Hence, the net lifetime returns to a four-year college education is reduced to
29:7¡6:3 = 23:4 percent. Notice that the risk premium on a four-year college
education oﬀsets almost a quarter of the return to schooling. In contrast,
for a two-year college education, the risk diﬀerential is approximately zero.
These results suggest that investing in a four-year college education is indeed
risky, while a two-year college education may not be.19 To interpret this dif-
ference, one may consider that a four-year college education is a long-term
18e:065£4 ¡ 1 = :297.
19Note that if ﬁelds of major at college are controlled in the regression, the estimated
risk diﬀerential will increase by a small extent.
20investment relative to a two-year college education. The postponement of
payoﬀs from a four-year college education may generate a degree of earnings
uncertainty.
Finally, it is worth noting that although this paper focuses on the risk-
iness of schooling caused by earnings uncertainty, unemployment is also an
important source of risk associated with college attendance, as pointed out
by Mincer (1991). According to Mincer’s estimation, the probability of un-
employment is 6.4 percent for high school graduates, but only 3.5 percent
for four-year college graduates. Of course, if the risk of unemployment is
incorporated as a part of earnings uncertainties, the risk diﬀerential will be
smaller than the one that I estimate above.
5 Conclusion
Is investing in a college education risky? This paper has separately estimated
the risk diﬀerentials caused by permanent and transitory shocks to answer
this question. I ﬁnd there is substantial and statistically signiﬁcant risk
associated with an investment in a college education.
After correcting for the selection bias problems neglected in the literature,
the estimates of permanent risk diﬀerentials dramatically increase. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation implies that the risk premium on a four-year college
education may oﬀset a large portion of the returns to schooling. A numerical
example shows that the risk premium may reduce the rate of the return
from 29.7 percent to 23.4 percent. This ﬁnding suggests that the riskiness of
college attendance can potentially be a factor in shaping the schooling choice
in certain circumstances.
It is worth noting that although this paper focuses on the riskiness of
schooling caused by earnings uncertainties, unemployment is also an impor-
tant source of the risk associated with college attendance. If the risk of
unemployment is incorporated as a part of earnings uncertainties, the esti-
mated risk diﬀerential will be smaller. On the other hand, the estimated risk
diﬀerentials control for the number of years of college education. Neverthe-
less, many students enroll in college not knowing whether they will drop out
during school years, nor whether they will attend a graduate school in the
future. If the uncertainty in the number of years of schooling is taken into
account, the risk diﬀerential will be much larger and oﬀset a greater portion
of the return to schooling than that estimated in this paper.
21References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and Pischke, J.S. “Changes in the Wage Struc-
ture, Family Income and Children’s Education.” European Economic
Review, 2001, 45(4-6), pp. 890-904.
[2] Altonji, Joseph G. “The Demand for and Return to Education When
Education Outcomes Are Uncertain.” Journal of Labor Economics,
1993, 11(1), 48-83.
[3] Angrist, Joshua D. and Newey, Whitney K. “Over-Identiﬁcation
Tests in Earnings Functions with Fixed Eﬀects.” Journal of Business
and Economics Statistics, 9(3), 1991, pp. 317-23.
[4] Attanasio, Orazio P. and Davis, Steven K. “Relative Wage Move-
ments and the Distribution of Consumption.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 104(6), 1996, pp. 1227-62.
[5] Becker, Gary S. Human Capital. 1964; 1993. New York: Columbia
University Press.
[6] ——. Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income. 1967,
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
[7] Blundell, Richard and Preston, Ian. “Consumption Inequality and
Income Uncertainty.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, pp. 603-40.
[8] Blundell, Richard and Stoker, T.M. “Consumption and the Timing
of Income Risk.” European Economic Review, 43(3), 1999, pp. 475-507.
[9] Buchinsky, Moshe and Leslie, Phillip. “Educational Attainment
and the Changing US Structure: Some Dynamic Implications.” Working
Paper 97/13, 1997, Department of Economics, Brown University.
[10] Cameron, Stephen and Heckman, James. “Life Cycle Schooling
and Educational Selectivity: Models and Choice.” Journal of Political
Economy, 106(2), 1998, pp. 262-333.
[11] ——. “Should College Attendance Be Further Subsidized to Reduce Ris-
ing Wage Inequality? Does Family Income Foster Ability or Is It an Im-
portant Cash Constraint Limiting College Attendance?” In Financing
22College Tuition : Government Policies Social Priorities, 1999a, edited
by Marvin Kosters. Washington, D. C.: AEI Press.
[12] ——. “The Dynamics of Education Attainment for Blacks, Whites and
Hispanics.” Working paper W7249, 1999b, Cambridge, Mass: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
[13] Cameron, Stephen and Taber, Christopher. “Borrowing Con-
straints and Returns to Schooling.” 2000, Manuscript.
[14] Campbell, J.Y. “Understanding Risk and Return.” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 104(2), 1996, pp. 298-345.
[15] Card, David. “Earnings, Schooling, and Ability Revisited.” In Re-
search in Labor Economics, 1995a, edited by Solomon Polachek, Green-
wich Connecticut: JAI Press, pp. 23-48.
[16] ——. “Using Geographic Variations in College Proximity to Estimate
the Return to Schooling.” In Aspects of Labor Market Behavior: Essays
in Honor of John Vanderkamp, 1995b, edited by Louis N. Christoﬁdes,
E. Kenneth Grant, and Robert Swidinsky, Toronto: Canada: University
of Toronto Press, pp. 201-22.
[17] ——. “The Causal Eﬀect of Education on Earnings.” In Chapter 30,
Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D.
Card, Vol. 3a. Handbooks in Economics, Vol. 5. Amsterdam; New York
and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland, pp. 1801-63.
[18] Deaton, Angus. Understanding Consumption. 1992. Clarendon Lec-
tures in Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[19] Efron, Bradley and Tibshirani, Robert. “Bootstrap Method for
Standard Errors, Conﬁdence Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical
Accuracy.” Statistics Science, 1(1), 1986, pp. 54-75.
[20] Ellwood, David T. and Kane, Thomas J. “Who Is Getting a Col-
lege Education? Family Background and the Growing Gaps in Edu-
cation.” In Securing the Future: Investing in Children from Birth to
College, edited by Sheldon Danziger and Jane Waldfogel, 2000, New
York: Ford Foundation Series on Asset Building.
23[21] Greene, Wiliam H. Econometric Analysis. 1997, Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
[22] Heckman, James J. “Sample Selection Bias as a Speciﬁcation Error.”
Econometrica, 47(1), 1979, pp. 153-61.
[23] —— and Lochner, Lance. “Rethinking Education and Training Pol-
icy: Understanding the Sources of Skill Formation in a Modern Econ-
omy.” In Securing the Future: Investing in Children From Birth to Col-
lege, edited by Sheldon Danziger and Jane Waldfogel, 2000, New York:
Ford Foundation Series on Asset Building.
[24] Kane, Thomas J. “College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role
of College Costs, Family Background, and the Returns to Education.”
Journal of Political Economy, 1994, pp. 878-911.
[25] ——. “Rising Public College Tuition and College Entry: How Well
Do Public Subsidies Promote Access to College.” National Bureau of
Economic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Paper No. 5164, 1995.
[26] Keane, Michaek P. and Wolpin, Kenneth I. “The Eﬀect of
Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints on Educational Attain-
ment.” Unpublished manuscript, 1999.
[27] Kyriazidou, Ekaterini. “Estimation of a Panel Data Sample Selection
Model.” Econometrica, 65(6), 1997, pp. 1335-64.
[28] Levhari, David and Weiss, Yoram. “The Eﬀect of Risk on the In-
vestment in Human Capital.” American Economics Review, 64(6), 1974,
pp. 950-63.
[29] Meghir, C. and Palme, M. “Assessing the Eﬀect of Schooling on
Earnings Using a Social Experiment.” Institute for Fiscal Studies Work-
ing Paper: 99(10), 1999.
[30] Mincer, Jacob. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. 1974, New York:
Columbia University Press.
[31] ——. “Education and Unemployment.” National Bureau of Economic
Research (Cambridge, MA), Working Paper No. 3838, 1991.
24[32] Mooney, Christopher Z. and Duval, Robert D. “Bootstrapping:
a Nonparametric Approach to Statistical Inference.” Newbury Park CA:
Sage Publication, 1993.
[33] Olson, Lawrence; White, Halbert; and Shefrin, H.M. “Optimal
Investment in Schooling When Income Are Risky.” Journal of Political
Economy, 87(3), 1979, pp. 522-39.
[34] Palacio-Huerta,I. “An Empirical Analysis of the Properties of Human
Capital Returns.” Working Paper, Brown University and University of
Chicago, 1999.
[35] Shea, John. “Does Parents’ Money Matter?” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 77(2), 2000, pp. 155-84.
[36] Taber, Christopher R. “Semiparametric Identiﬁcation and Hetero-
geneity in Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Models.” Journal of
Econometrics, 96(2), 2000, pp. 201-229.
[37] Weiss, Yoram. “The Risk Element in Occupational and Educational
Choices.” Journal of Political Economy, 86(6), 1972, pp. 1203-13.
[38] Willis, Robert J. and Rosen, Sherwin. “Education and Self-
Selection.” Journal of Political Economy, 87(5), 1979, pp. S7-36.
25Table 1: College enrollment rates of high school graduates, age 32-40 in 1997,
with AFQT in the top quartile, by family income and parental education.









1. All high school graduates 15.8 15.3 68.9 2265
2. By family income:
Low 17.9 19.3 62.9 140
Middle 12.7 18.3 69.0 394
High 10.5 12.9 76.7 630
3. By parental education:
High school or below 21.9 19.6 58.6 1537
College attendees 4.6 11.1 84.3 1519
Note: : (i) Afqt (Armed Force Qualiﬁcation Test) scores are deﬂated by the
corresponding cohort average. (ii) Disadvantage groups, represented by the
supplemental sample, are included in Items 2-3. In Item 1, I use random sample.
(iii) Family income is deﬁned in the paper. Notice that family income variables
are available only for those cohorts between the ages between 32-35 in 1997.
(iv) Parental education is deﬁned by the highest education level of parents.
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979-98.
26Table 2: Comparison of Baseline Characteristics of Individuals At Age 32-
40 in 1997, by College Attendance and Scholastic Ability (AFQT) Scores.
(Continued)






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Demographics
Percent whites 87.6 85.8 88.5 96.7 96.7
(33.0) (34.9) (32.0) (18.0) (17.8)
Percent blacks 10.3 11.3 9.7 1.6 2.2
(30.3) (31.6) (29.7) (12.8) (14.5)
Percent males 48.9 50.9 47.9 56.0 53.4
(50.0) (50.0) (50.0) (49.8) (49.9)
2. Education
Years of schooling 13.9 12 14.8 12 15.6
(2.2) (0.0) (2.2) (0.0) (2.1)
Average log cost of 6.2 6.4 6.1 6.5 6.2
attending local public (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (.9) (.9)
4-year college at age 17(2)
3. Family Background
Average family income 11778.4 10064.2 12631.0 12025.6 13923.6
per person (7519.4) (6520.5) (7833.9) (6509.4) (8041.5)
Percent a parent 36.1 14.6 46.6 21.7 58.3
attended college(3) (48.0) (35.3) (49.9) (41.3) (49.3)
Sample size(4) 3216 1091 2125 182 1112
Note: (i) Standard deviations are in parentheses. (ii) Cost of attending local public
four-year college is deﬁned in the Data Section. (iii) Parents are recognized as have
attended college if the years of schooling is equal to or greater than 13. (iv) Sample
sizes of the family income variable are about half of the full-sample. The sample
sizes listed in the bottom row are the number of respondents for all variables, except
for family income.
27Table 3: Comparison of Baseline Characteristics of Individuals At Age 32-40
in 1997, by College Attendance and Scholastic Ability (AFQT) Scores.











Average nominal 16.7 18.6 12.7 21.8 14.6
hourly wage (13.4) (14.5) (9.6) (16.3) (10.6)
Average log real 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.4
hourly wage (6.9) (.7) (.6) (.7) (.6)
Average annual 2116.8 2128.6 2091.4 2175.1 2132.2
working hours (823.4) (827.9) (814.0) (857.4) (792.2)
Average working 14.8 14.9 14.5 15.4 16.1
experience, years (4.0) (3.8) (4.4) (3.4) (3.8)
Sample size 3500 2353 1147 1224 226
Note: (v) Nominal hourly wage is calculated from annual wages and earnings divided
by total working hours in the year. (vi) Real wage is derived by normalizing the nominal
wage by the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deﬂator for the base year 1992. (vii)
Years of work experience is deﬁned by the accumulated annual ratio of the number
of working weeks to the number of total weeks since 1975. Note that in 1975 respondents
were age 10 to 18. (viii) Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: National Longitudinal Survey for Youth of 1979-1998.
28Table 4: College Attendance and the Mean and Variance of Log Earnings:
1982-97, White Males.
High School College Attendees
Log of Earnings: Graduates Total 2-year 4-year
1. Cross-sectional mean of individual average:
1982-1989, age 23-28 2.201 2.370 2.337 2.383
(.007) (.005) (.010) (.006)
1990-1997, age 31-36 2.390 2.692 2.577 2.733
(.008) (.006) (.011) (.007)
2. Variance of
a. individual average:
1982-1989, age 23-28 .258 .247 .227 .253
1990-1997, age 31-36 .303 .390 .367 .387
b. deviations from individual average:
1982-1989, age 23-28 .107 .112 .101 .116
1990-1997, age 31-36 .078 .083 .073 .086
3. Diﬀerence in variance of
a. individual average:
1982-1989, age 23-28 - -.010¤¤ -.031¤¤ -.004¤¤
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
1990-1997, age 31-36 - .086+ .064 .083
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
b. deviations from individual average:
1982-1989, age 23-28 - .005¤¤ -.006¤¤ .009¤¤
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
1990-1997, age 31-36 - .005¤¤ -.005¤¤ .008¤¤
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
4. Number of respondents:
1982-1989, age 23-28 661 1348 351 997
1990-1997, age 31-36 637 1244 322 922
5. Number of Observations
1982-1989, age 23-28 2660 5529 1478 4051
1990-1997, age 31-36 1758 3544 924 2620
Note: (i) In the ﬁrst item, standard errors are in parentheses. (ii) The ¤¤
and ¤ indicate the 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels respectively. (iii) Note
that NLSY has no observations for wage and earnings in 1994 and 1996.
29Table 5: Earnings, Earnings Risk and Risk Diﬀerentials — Fixed Eﬀects.
High College
Estimates and School Attendees
Tests Graduates Total 2-year 4–year
1. Log wage equation (ﬁxed-eﬀects):
a. Years of schooling - - - -
b. Experience .065¤¤ .072¤¤ .074¤¤ .073¤¤
(.003) (.002) (.004) (.003)
c. Experience squared -.002¤¤ -.002¤¤ -.002¤¤ -.002¤¤
(.001) (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
d. Marital status .038¤¤ .079¤¤ .065¤¤ .083¤¤
(.013) (.010) (.020) (.013)
e. Regional dummies yes¤¤ yes¤¤ yes¤¤ yes¤¤
(F-test; p-value) (.006) (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
2. R2 .103 .155 .152 .158
3. Transitory shocks:
a. Variance .188 .166 .167 .165
b. Risk diﬀerentials - -.022¤¤ -.021¤¤ -.023¤¤
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
4. Permanent shocks (with selection bias):
a. Variance .177 .230 .192 .228
b. Risk diﬀerentials - .052¤¤ .015¤¤ .051¤¤
(F-test; p-value) - (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
5. Percentage of unexplained variation
due to permanent shocks (with selection bias)
48.4 58.1 53.5 53.9
6. Number of respondents 1551 2828 843 1985
7. Number of observations 16952 25098 8566 16532
Note: (i) and (ii): same as Table 4. (iii) ‘-’ indicates ‘not available’.
(iv) “Reginal dummies” include urban, south, north east, and west.
30Table 6: Explaining College Attendance – the Probit Model.
Changes in
College enrollment Coeﬃcients Probability
1. Explanatory variables:
a. Log cost of attendance -.125¤¤ -.039¤¤
(.025) (.008)
b. High school graduation year yes¤¤ yes¤¤
(Chi square (2); p-value) (.000+) (.000+)
c. Afqt scores .023¤¤ .007¤¤
(.001) (.000+)
d. Parental education yes¤¤ yes¤¤
(Chi square (4); p-value) (.000+) (.000+)
e. Black .691¤¤ .218¤¤
(.084) (.027)
f. Male -.196¤¤ -.062¤¤
(.046) (.015)
g. Regional dummies at age 17 yes¤¤ yes¤¤
(Chi square (4); p-value) (.011) (.011)
2. LR test, chi-squared 1191.80
3. Number of respondents 4138
Note: (i) and (ii): same as Table 4. (iii) The instrument in row
a is deﬂated by the average hourly wage of local unskilled workers.
(iv) Row b contains quadratic terms of high school graduation years.
(v) Parental education includes the number of years of education of
mother, the number of years of education of father, and their cross
terms. (vi) Regional dummies include whether one lived in an urban
area, northeastern, west, and south at age 14. (vii) A dummy variable
for races other than black and white is also included in the model.
(viii) The changes in probability are evaluated at sample means of other
variables.
31Table 7: Between-Eﬀects Model.
High College
Estimates and School Attendees
Tests Graduates Total 2-year 4–year
1. Log wage equation (between-eﬀects):
a. Years of schooling - .061¤¤ .044¤¤ .065¤¤
- (.004) (.015) (.006)
b. Experience .029 .035¤¤ .026 .032¤
(.021) (.016) (.028) (.019)
c. Experience squared .002 .000+ .002 -.000+
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
d. Afqt .001 -.001 -.000+ -.003¤
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
e. Parental education yes yes¤¤ yes yes¤¤
(Chi squared; p-value) (.852) (.012) (.432) (.005)
f. Black -.067¤¤ -.155¤¤ -.083 -.216¤¤
(.049) (.048) (.077) (.063)
g. Male .274¤¤ .264¤¤ .270¤¤ .265¤¤
(.023) (.018) (.031) (.023)
h. Current marital status .064¤¤ .074¤¤ .053¤¤ .091¤¤
(.028) (.022) (.039) (.026)
i. Regional dummies yes¤¤ yes¤¤ yes¤¤ yes¤¤
(F-test; p-value) (.000+) (.000+) (.000+) (.000+)
j. Cohort eﬀects yes yes yes yes¤¤
(F-test; p-value) (.146) (.277) (.715) (.047)
k. Inverse Mills ratio .181¤¤ .264¤¤ .196 .336¤¤
(.078) (.069) (.114) (.088)
2. R2 .379 .379 .402 .334
3. Number of respondents 1210 2359 662 1697
4. Number of observations 13785 21227 6899 14328
Note: (i) and (ii): same as Table 4. (iii) Parental education include
years of schooling of mother and father. (iv) Regional dummies include
whether currently lived in an urban area, northeast, west, and south.
32Table 8: Earnings, Earnings Risk and Risk Diﬀerentials.
High College
Estimates and Test School Attendees
Statistics Graduates Total 2-year 4–year
1. Earnings risk and risk diﬀerentials due to:
A. Transitory shocks:
a. Variance .188 .166 .167 .165
b. Risk diﬀerentials - -.022¤¤ -.021 -.023¤¤
(p-value) - (.000+) (.168) (.000+)
B. Permanent shocks:
a. Variance .197 .283 .220 .322
b. Risk diﬀerentials - .086¤¤ .023 .126¤¤
(conﬁdence intervals) - (.022, .172) (-.015, .084) (.037, .266)
-
2. Percentage of unexplained variation
due to permanent shocks:
51.2 63.0 56.8 66.1
Note: (i) and (ii): same as Table 4. (iii) The conﬁdence intervals of the
risk diﬀerentials in row b are based on bootstrapping with 1001 replications.
The size for each replication is the number of observations.
33A The Schooling Choice Rule
The schooling choice rule (3) can be derived as follows. Consider a multiple-
period model where an individual makes a college attendance decision in the
ﬁrst period and obtains earnings in each period afterwards. His earnings
are determined by Mincer’s earnings equation conditional on his characteris-
tics and information about permanent and transitory shocks. He makes his
schooling decision by calculating his expected lifetime utility. The calculation
is based on three assumptions. First, the utility function exhibits constant
relative risk aversion. Second, permanent shocks, transitory shocks, and
unobservable individual eﬀects are normally distributed. Permanent shocks
are independent across individuals but are correlated with unobservable in-
dividual eﬀects, whereas transitory shocks are identically and independently
distributed over periods and across individuals. Third, the eﬀect of transitory
shocks on lifetime earnings is smoothed out over one’s lifetime. I express the
expect lifetime utility by a certainty equivalent, which leads to the schooling
choice rule (3). The details follow.
Person i makes a schooling decision by comparing his earnings streams
between attending and not attending college. His decision is based on the fol-
lowing information: personal characteristics (xi1;xi2;¢¢¢ ;xiT;zi), the eﬀect
of family support for schooling ´i, and the perceived distributions of perma-
nent shocks ai and transitory shocks "it. Notably, since only person i can
observe his individual eﬀect of family support for schooling ´i, his perceived
earnings stream is slightly diﬀerent from what econometricians observe in
Mincer’s equation (1),








aai + ¾" (s)"it:
This equation is appropriate because the triple (ai;"it;´i) is normally dis-
tributed; ½a is the correlation coeﬃcient between ai and ´i, ¾a is the uncon-
ditional variance of permanent shock, and ¾" is the unconditional variance
of transitory shocks. The conditional variances of permanent and transitory
shocks are








V ar[¾" (s)"it j´i] = ¾
2
" (s):
34Let ¹it denote the deterministic component of earnings, x0
it®+z0
i¯. Summing












aai + ¾" (s)"it
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where R is a discount factor. Notably, ¹i0(0) indicates the foregone earnings,
and ¹i0(1) represents the cost of attendance. It is convenient to deﬁne the








Assume that individual utility is a function of lifetime earnings, exhibiting










where ° denotes the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. If °
equals unity, the preference degenerates into a logarithmic function. The
expected lifetime utility can be derived as follows,
E0 [u(y
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where E0 is the expectation operator based on the information in the begin-
ning of period 1. The second line is appropriate only if (i) the permanent
shock ai is normally distributed so that E0 [etai] = exp[t2¾2
a (s)=2], and (ii)
the expected lifetime utility can be approximated by the ﬁrst-order Taylor
expansion around "it = E ["it] = 0. Then, the expected lifetime utility can
be expressed by a certainty equivalent, deﬁned by E0 [u(y
p
i(s))] = u(cei (s)),
such that

















The comparison between expected lifetime earnings is equivalent to the com-
























where I f¢g is an indicator function.
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